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THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINEP ROBABLY the most noteworthy decision rendered by the Texas
Supreme Court in 1948 in the field of torts is to be found
in the case of Banker v. McLaughlin.' The McLaughlin case in-
volved the doctrine of attractive nuisance as applied to child tres-
passers, and the decision of the majority applied the ordinary
principles of negligence in holding the landowner liable for an
injury to a child arising from "dangerous conditions" existing
on his premises. The court's holding was quite in line with the
first Texas Supreme Court ruling on the doctrine of attractive
nuisance, found in the case of F. G. Evansich v. Gulf, C. & S. F.
Railway Co.,2 which accepted without qualification the doctrine
as established by the U. S. Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v.
Stout.' Interest in the decision is stimulated not by its originality
in Texas tort law, but by the fact that it represents a return to
principles from which the Texas courts had tended to veer in the
years intervening between the decisions in the Evansich case and
the McLaughlin case.'
In the McLaughlin case the defendant, owner of a 60-acre sub-
division near Orange, Texas, was improving streets therein, and
'146 Tex. 434, 208 S. W. (2d) 843 (1948).
257 Tex 126 (1882).
317 Wall. 657 (1873).
4In 1896. in Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Edwards, 90 Tex. 65, 36 S. W. 430,
the court followed the theory that the attractive, dangerous premises constitute an im-
plied invitation to the child to enter in an effort to harmonize the attractive nuisance
doctrine with the rule that a landowner owed no duty to a trespasser to keep the
premises safe. A year later, in Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 60, 41 S. W.
62 (1897), the court appeared to hold that no landowner could be liable for negligent
harms inflicted on a trespasser, even when the trespasser was a child. Then in 1898
in the case of San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 92 Tex. 98. 46 S. W. 28, the
court, though returning to the invitation doctrine, limited its application to cases
where the child was attracted to the premises by something there maintained by the
landowner which was calculated to attract another. The Morgan case rule had not been
questioned until the court decided the McLaughlin case.
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developing homesites for sale. On one of these homesites, an
excavation had been left unattended and had filled with rain
water. It was five to eight feet deep at its most shallow point. The
plaintiff had already purchased and occupied a homesite in the
tract some 300 to 350 yards from the excavation. In this water
hole plaintiff's minor son drowned. The water-filled excavation
was not visible from the nearest street, which was largely un-
traveled. The defendant himself testified to the effect that the
cost of drainage of the pit was negligible, and its utility value, if
any, was speculative only. Some 50 families already lived in the
subdivision within a radius of a few hundred yards of the pit,
and some 40 of these families had small children. Plaintiff's son
was just under six years of age. In decisions since the Evansich
case, Texas courts had considered the fact that a child was a tres-
passer, or that he was not actually attracted to the premises by
the dangerous condition, as defenses available to a defendant as
a matter of law.5 In the McLaughlin case, the court treated the
fact of trespassing and the fact that the child was not attracted to
the premises in the first instance by the dangerous condition
merely as evidence which the jury might consider in determining
the issue of whether the defendant had acted as a "reasonably
prudent man" would have acted under like or similar circum-
stances.
The court stressed the negligible utility of the water-filled exca-
vation to the defendant, the trivial expense to be incurred in drain-
ing it, and the grave, foreseeable-and now actual-danger which
the continued existence of the water hole produced.'
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-A JURY QUESTION
Another case of considerable interest is that of Lang v. Hen.
derson,7 in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine that
5See note 4 supra.
6Williams, Banker v. McLaughlin-A Return to the Principles of the First "Turn-
table" Case, 3 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 78 (1949) is a more elaborate comment on the
McLaughlin case.
7 ------- Tex -.-........... 215 S. W . (2d) 585 (1948).
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contributory negligence is a jury question when the facts of the
case will admit of more than one conclusion! Furthermore, the
court applied the rule that when a landlord has leased premises
to several tenants, retaining possession or control of a part for
their common use, he becomes liable to a tenant who suffers injury
due to the defective condition of that portion.9 The rule is not
new, having first been laid down in Texas in the case of O'Connor
v. Andrews"0 in 1891, but its application to the facts of the Lang
case is unique.
In the Lang case plaintiff and his wife occupied one of eight
utility apartments in a house owned by defendant. In plaintiff's
apartment was located the gas-operated water heater which fur-
nished hot water to all eight apartments. Defendant had agreed
under OPA regulations to furnish all utilities to all apartments,
and had reserved a key to plaintiff's apartment in order to be
able to maintain the hot water supply. On several occasions, over
a period of months, plaintiff reported to defendant that the heater
was leaking gas. On each occasion, defendant promised to have
the heater repaired. As the fumes became worse, plaintiff and
his wife shut the door each night which led from the kitchen to
their bedroom, and left the kitchen window open in order that
the gas escaping from the heater in the kitchen might pass out of
the house. Early one morning, plaintiff and his wife awoke to
find the kitchen on fire around the heater, and the evidence showed
or tended to show that the heater caused the fire. Plaintiff's wife
was injured in the fire, and their personal property in the apart-
ment was damaged. The trial court instructed a verdict for de-
fendant, holding plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision,
"As stated by the court, "The court can withdraw the question of contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff from the jury and determine it as a question of law only when
from the facts in evidence but one rational inference can be drawn . . . contributory
negligence is a question of fact for the jury when the evidence shows that the plaintiff,
with knowledge of the danger, exercised some care." Id. at 587.
"ld. at 588.
1016 S. W. 628 (1891).
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stating that the plaintiff, being cognizant of the danger, should
have vacated the premises or repaired the heater himself. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals
and remanded the cause for a new trial.
The court defined negligence per se," and held that the fact
situation here lay outside the purview of that definition. In short,
the court felt that the simple fact that plaintiff remained in the
apartment, without himself repairing the leaking boiler, did not
make him guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Actually, of course, the plaintiff had done something. He had
informed the defendant of the existing defect, and he had left the
window in the kitchen open in order that the gas might escape
from the closed quarters. He had not sat idly by, aware of the
existing danger, and yet doing nothing for his own protection.
The evidence revealed that plaintiff was a student; his wife was
pregnant. As an interesting and applicable sidelight, the court
took judicial notice of the acute housing shortage in Dallas as a
fact of common knowledge. It was apparently the court's thought
that the housing shortage should be weighed by a subsequent jury
in deciding as a matter of fact whether plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, and therefore barred from recovering his damages from
the defendant landlord.
The rule of the O'Connor case regarding a landlord's liability
to his tenants 2 has been applied in holding a landlord liable for
damages caused by a leaking roof when the building was leased
to several tenants. 3 In Denson v. Willcox, 4 decided in 1927, the
Commission of Appeals ruled that the doctrine was applicable to
a party wall between two leased portions of a building, the de-
l "in order that an act shall be deemed negligent per se, it must have h-en done con-
trary to a statutory duty or it must appear so opposed to the dictates of common pru-
dence that we can say, without hesitation or doubt, that no careful person would have
committed it." 215 S. W. (2d) 585, 587 (1948).
12 See note 9 supra.
13 Clayton D. Brown Co. v. O'Connor, 151 S. W. 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ; Archibald
v. Fidelity Title & Trust Co., 296 S. W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Medlin v. Havener,
98 S. W. (2d) 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
1" 298 S. W. 534 (Tex. Com. App. 1927).
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fendant landlord being held liable for damages to a tenant which
were suffered when the wall collapsed.
In 1944 the Supreme Court, in Flynn v. Pan American Hotel
Co.,15 had qualified the doctrine by stating that the reservation
by a lessor of a right to enter the premises to make such repairs
and alterations as he may elect is not a reservation of control over
a part of the building and that an obligation on the part of the
lessor to make repairs does not arise from the reservation of such
right. At first glance the holding in the Flynn case might appear
to be contra to that of the Lang case, but the two holdings are
clearly distinguishable on the facts. In the Flynn case the land-
lord reserved the right to enter the apartments of the various
tenants to make such repairs there as he saw fit to make, while
in the Lang case the landlord reserved the right to enter plaintiff's
apartment to maintain adequate hot water service, which he was
bound by his commitments under OPA regulations to furnish to
all of the apartments in the building. The decision in the Lang case
appears to be clearly in line with previous decisions involving
the duty of a landlord to his tenants,16 but the fact that the part
of the premises "not included in the holding of any one tenant"
is here actually located in plaintiff's apartment makes the case
unique on its facts alone. The repairs in each apartment of the
tenants in the Flynn case could have benefitted only the individual
tenants, while the repair to the gas-operated water heater in the
Lang case was essential to the well-being of all of defendant's
tenants in all of the apartments in the building.
If a subsequent trial court jury finds as a matter of fact that
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent in remaining in the
apartment, making no repairs himself, and yet being at the time
aware of the existing danger, then the Supreme Court has already
stated that the boiler, even though located within plantiff's
kitchen, is "a part of the premises retained by the landlord for
15 143 Tex. 219. 18 S. W. (2d) 446 (1944).
16 Meeker v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 94 S. W. (2d) 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) Morton
v. Benton-Lingo Co., 150 S. W. (2d) 239 (Tex. Com. App. 1941).
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